π File detail
utils/deepLink/parseDeepLink.ts
π― Use case
This file lives under βutils/β, which covers cross-cutting helpers (shell, tempfiles, settings, messages, process input, β¦). On the API surface it exposes DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL, DeepLinkAction, parseDeepLink, and buildDeepLink β mainly functions, hooks, or classes. It composes internal code from sanitization (relative imports). What the file header says: Deep Link URI Parser Parses `claude-cli://open` URIs. All parameters are optional: q β pre-fill the prompt input (not submitted) cwd β working directory (absolute path) repo β owner/name slug, resolved against githubRepoPaths config Examples: claude-cli://open claude-cli://open?q.
Generated from folder role, exports, dependency roots, and inline comments β not hand-reviewed for every path.
π§ Inline summary
Deep Link URI Parser Parses `claude-cli://open` URIs. All parameters are optional: q β pre-fill the prompt input (not submitted) cwd β working directory (absolute path) repo β owner/name slug, resolved against githubRepoPaths config Examples: claude-cli://open claude-cli://open?q=hello+world claude-cli://open?q=fix+tests&repo=owner/repo claude-cli://open?cwd=/path/to/project Security: values are URL-decoded, Unicode-sanitized, and rejected if they contain ASCII control characters (newlines etc. can act as command separators). All values are single-quote shell-escaped at the point of use (terminalLauncher.ts) β that escaping is the injection boundary.
π€ Exports (heuristic)
DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOLDeepLinkActionparseDeepLinkbuildDeepLink
π₯οΈ Source preview
/**
* Deep Link URI Parser
*
* Parses `claude-cli://open` URIs. All parameters are optional:
* q β pre-fill the prompt input (not submitted)
* cwd β working directory (absolute path)
* repo β owner/name slug, resolved against githubRepoPaths config
*
* Examples:
* claude-cli://open
* claude-cli://open?q=hello+world
* claude-cli://open?q=fix+tests&repo=owner/repo
* claude-cli://open?cwd=/path/to/project
*
* Security: values are URL-decoded, Unicode-sanitized, and rejected if they
* contain ASCII control characters (newlines etc. can act as command
* separators). All values are single-quote shell-escaped at the point of
* use (terminalLauncher.ts) β that escaping is the injection boundary.
*/
import { partiallySanitizeUnicode } from '../sanitization.js'
export const DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL = 'claude-cli'
export type DeepLinkAction = {
query?: string
cwd?: string
repo?: string
}
/**
* Check if a string contains ASCII control characters (0x00-0x1F, 0x7F).
* These can act as command separators in shells (newlines, carriage returns, etc.).
* Allows printable ASCII and Unicode (CJK, emoji, accented chars, etc.).
*/
function containsControlChars(s: string): boolean {
for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {
const code = s.charCodeAt(i)
if (code <= 0x1f || code === 0x7f) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
/**
* GitHub owner/repo slug: alphanumerics, dots, hyphens, underscores,
* exactly one slash. Keeps this from becoming a path traversal vector.
*/
const REPO_SLUG_PATTERN = /^[\w.-]+\/[\w.-]+$/
/**
* Cap on pre-filled prompt length. The only defense against a prompt like
* "review PR #18796 [β¦4900 chars of paddingβ¦] also cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa" is
* the user reading it before pressing Enter. At this length the prompt is
* no longer scannable at a glance, so banner.ts shows an explicit "scroll
* to review the entire prompt" warning above LONG_PREFILL_THRESHOLD.
* Reject, don't truncate β truncation changes meaning.
*
* 5000 is the practical ceiling: the Windows cmd.exe fallback
* (terminalLauncher.ts) has an 8191-char command-string limit, and after
* the `cd /d <cwd> && <claude.exe> --deep-link-origin ... --prefill "<q>"`
* wrapper plus cmdQuote's %β%% expansion, ~7000 chars of query is the
* hard stop for typical inputs. A pathological >60%-percent-sign query
* would 2Γ past the limit, but cmd.exe is the last-resort fallback
* (wt.exe and PowerShell are tried first) and the failure mode is a
* launch error, not a security issue β so we don't penalize real users
* for an implausible input.
*/
const MAX_QUERY_LENGTH = 5000
/**
* PATH_MAX on Linux is 4096. Windows MAX_PATH is 260 (32767 with long-path
* opt-in). No real path approaches this; a cwd over 4096 is malformed or
* malicious.
*/
const MAX_CWD_LENGTH = 4096
/**
* Parse a claude-cli:// URI into a structured action.
*
* @throws {Error} if the URI is malformed or contains dangerous characters
*/
export function parseDeepLink(uri: string): DeepLinkAction {
// Normalize: accept with or without the trailing colon in protocol
const normalized = uri.startsWith(`${DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL}://`)
? uri
: uri.startsWith(`${DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL}:`)
? uri.replace(`${DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL}:`, `${DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL}://`)
: null
if (!normalized) {
throw new Error(
`Invalid deep link: expected ${DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL}:// scheme, got "${uri}"`,
)
}
let url: URL
try {
url = new URL(normalized)
} catch {
throw new Error(`Invalid deep link URL: "${uri}"`)
}
if (url.hostname !== 'open') {
throw new Error(`Unknown deep link action: "${url.hostname}"`)
}
const cwd = url.searchParams.get('cwd') ?? undefined
const repo = url.searchParams.get('repo') ?? undefined
const rawQuery = url.searchParams.get('q')
// Validate cwd if present β must be an absolute path
if (cwd && !cwd.startsWith('/') && !/^[a-zA-Z]:[/\\]/.test(cwd)) {
throw new Error(
`Invalid cwd in deep link: must be an absolute path, got "${cwd}"`,
)
}
// Reject control characters in cwd (newlines, etc.) but allow path chars like backslash.
if (cwd && containsControlChars(cwd)) {
throw new Error('Deep link cwd contains disallowed control characters')
}
if (cwd && cwd.length > MAX_CWD_LENGTH) {
throw new Error(
`Deep link cwd exceeds ${MAX_CWD_LENGTH} characters (got ${cwd.length})`,
)
}
// Validate repo slug format. Resolution happens later (protocolHandler.ts) β
// this parser stays pure with no config/filesystem access.
if (repo && !REPO_SLUG_PATTERN.test(repo)) {
throw new Error(
`Invalid repo in deep link: expected "owner/repo", got "${repo}"`,
)
}
let query: string | undefined
if (rawQuery && rawQuery.trim().length > 0) {
// Strip hidden Unicode characters (ASCII smuggling / hidden prompt injection)
query = partiallySanitizeUnicode(rawQuery.trim())
if (containsControlChars(query)) {
throw new Error('Deep link query contains disallowed control characters')
}
if (query.length > MAX_QUERY_LENGTH) {
throw new Error(
`Deep link query exceeds ${MAX_QUERY_LENGTH} characters (got ${query.length})`,
)
}
}
return { query, cwd, repo }
}
/**
* Build a claude-cli:// deep link URL.
*/
export function buildDeepLink(action: DeepLinkAction): string {
const url = new URL(`${DEEP_LINK_PROTOCOL}://open`)
if (action.query) {
url.searchParams.set('q', action.query)
}
if (action.cwd) {
url.searchParams.set('cwd', action.cwd)
}
if (action.repo) {
url.searchParams.set('repo', action.repo)
}
return url.toString()
}