π File detail
utils/bash/shellQuote.ts
π― Use case
This file lives under βutils/β, which covers cross-cutting helpers (shell, tempfiles, settings, messages, process input, β¦). On the API surface it exposes ShellParseResult, ShellQuoteResult, tryParseShellCommand, tryQuoteShellArgs, and hasMalformedTokens (and more) β mainly functions, hooks, or classes. Dependencies touch shell-quote. It composes internal code from log and slowOperations (relative imports). What the file header says: Safe wrappers for shell-quote library functions that handle errors gracefully These are drop-in replacements for the original functions.
Generated from folder role, exports, dependency roots, and inline comments β not hand-reviewed for every path.
π§ Inline summary
Safe wrappers for shell-quote library functions that handle errors gracefully These are drop-in replacements for the original functions
π€ Exports (heuristic)
ShellParseResultShellQuoteResulttryParseShellCommandtryQuoteShellArgshasMalformedTokenshasShellQuoteSingleQuoteBugquote
π External import roots
Package roots from from "β¦" (relative paths omitted).
shell-quote
π₯οΈ Source preview
/**
* Safe wrappers for shell-quote library functions that handle errors gracefully
* These are drop-in replacements for the original functions
*/
import {
type ParseEntry,
parse as shellQuoteParse,
quote as shellQuoteQuote,
} from 'shell-quote'
import { logError } from '../log.js'
import { jsonStringify } from '../slowOperations.js'
export type { ParseEntry } from 'shell-quote'
export type ShellParseResult =
| { success: true; tokens: ParseEntry[] }
| { success: false; error: string }
export type ShellQuoteResult =
| { success: true; quoted: string }
| { success: false; error: string }
export function tryParseShellCommand(
cmd: string,
env?:
| Record<string, string | undefined>
| ((key: string) => string | undefined),
): ShellParseResult {
try {
const tokens =
typeof env === 'function'
? shellQuoteParse(cmd, env)
: shellQuoteParse(cmd, env)
return { success: true, tokens }
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
logError(error)
}
return {
success: false,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown parse error',
}
}
}
export function tryQuoteShellArgs(args: unknown[]): ShellQuoteResult {
try {
const validated: string[] = args.map((arg, index) => {
if (arg === null || arg === undefined) {
return String(arg)
}
const type = typeof arg
if (type === 'string') {
return arg as string
}
if (type === 'number' || type === 'boolean') {
return String(arg)
}
if (type === 'object') {
throw new Error(
`Cannot quote argument at index ${index}: object values are not supported`,
)
}
if (type === 'symbol') {
throw new Error(
`Cannot quote argument at index ${index}: symbol values are not supported`,
)
}
if (type === 'function') {
throw new Error(
`Cannot quote argument at index ${index}: function values are not supported`,
)
}
throw new Error(
`Cannot quote argument at index ${index}: unsupported type ${type}`,
)
})
const quoted = shellQuoteQuote(validated)
return { success: true, quoted }
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof Error) {
logError(error)
}
return {
success: false,
error: error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown quote error',
}
}
}
/**
* Checks if parsed tokens contain malformed entries that suggest shell-quote
* misinterpreted the command. This happens when input contains ambiguous
* patterns (like JSON-like strings with semicolons) that shell-quote parses
* according to shell rules, producing token fragments.
*
* For example, `echo {"hi":"hi;evil"}` gets parsed with `;` as an operator,
* producing tokens like `{hi:"hi` (unbalanced brace). Legitimate commands
* produce complete, balanced tokens.
*
* Also detects unterminated quotes in the original command: shell-quote
* silently drops an unmatched `"` or `'` and parses the rest as unquoted,
* leaving no trace in the tokens. `echo "hi;evil | cat` (one unmatched `"`)
* is a bash syntax error, but shell-quote yields clean tokens with `;` as
* an operator. The token-level checks below can't catch this, so we walk
* the original command with bash quote semantics and flag odd parity.
*
* Security: This prevents command injection via HackerOne #3482049 where
* shell-quote's correct parsing of ambiguous input can be exploited.
*/
export function hasMalformedTokens(
command: string,
parsed: ParseEntry[],
): boolean {
// Check for unterminated quotes in the original command. shell-quote drops
// an unmatched quote without leaving any trace in the tokens, so this must
// inspect the raw string. Walk with bash semantics: backslash escapes the
// next char outside single-quotes; no escapes inside single-quotes.
let inSingle = false
let inDouble = false
let doubleCount = 0
let singleCount = 0
for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
const c = command[i]
if (c === '\\' && !inSingle) {
i++
continue
}
if (c === '"' && !inSingle) {
doubleCount++
inDouble = !inDouble
} else if (c === "'" && !inDouble) {
singleCount++
inSingle = !inSingle
}
}
if (doubleCount % 2 !== 0 || singleCount % 2 !== 0) return true
for (const entry of parsed) {
if (typeof entry !== 'string') continue
// Check for unbalanced curly braces
const openBraces = (entry.match(/{/g) || []).length
const closeBraces = (entry.match(/}/g) || []).length
if (openBraces !== closeBraces) return true
// Check for unbalanced parentheses
const openParens = (entry.match(/\(/g) || []).length
const closeParens = (entry.match(/\)/g) || []).length
if (openParens !== closeParens) return true
// Check for unbalanced square brackets
const openBrackets = (entry.match(/\[/g) || []).length
const closeBrackets = (entry.match(/\]/g) || []).length
if (openBrackets !== closeBrackets) return true
// Check for unbalanced double quotes
// Count quotes that aren't escaped (preceded by backslash)
// A token with an odd number of unescaped quotes is malformed
// eslint-disable-next-line custom-rules/no-lookbehind-regex -- gated by hasCommandSeparator check at caller, runs on short per-token strings
const doubleQuotes = entry.match(/(?<!\\)"/g) || []
if (doubleQuotes.length % 2 !== 0) return true
// Check for unbalanced single quotes
// eslint-disable-next-line custom-rules/no-lookbehind-regex -- same as above
const singleQuotes = entry.match(/(?<!\\)'/g) || []
if (singleQuotes.length % 2 !== 0) return true
}
return false
}
/**
* Detects commands containing '\' patterns that exploit the shell-quote library's
* incorrect handling of backslashes inside single quotes.
*
* In bash, single quotes preserve ALL characters literally - backslash has no
* special meaning. So '\' is just the string \ (the quote opens, contains \,
* and the next ' closes it). But shell-quote incorrectly treats \ as an escape
* character inside single quotes, causing '\' to NOT close the quoted string.
*
* This means the pattern '\' <payload> '\' hides <payload> from security checks
* because shell-quote thinks it's all one single-quoted string.
*/
export function hasShellQuoteSingleQuoteBug(command: string): boolean {
// Walk the command with correct bash single-quote semantics
let inSingleQuote = false
let inDoubleQuote = false
for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i++) {
const char = command[i]
// Handle backslash escaping outside of single quotes
if (char === '\\' && !inSingleQuote) {
// Skip the next character (it's escaped)
i++
continue
}
if (char === '"' && !inSingleQuote) {
inDoubleQuote = !inDoubleQuote
continue
}
if (char === "'" && !inDoubleQuote) {
inSingleQuote = !inSingleQuote
// Check if we just closed a single quote and the content ends with
// trailing backslashes. shell-quote's chunker regex '((\\'|[^'])*?)'
// incorrectly treats \' as an escape sequence inside single quotes,
// while bash treats backslash as literal. This creates a differential
// where shell-quote merges tokens that bash treats as separate.
//
// Odd trailing \'s = always a bug:
// '\' -> shell-quote: \' = literal ', still open. bash: \, closed.
// 'abc\' -> shell-quote: abc then \' = literal ', still open. bash: abc\, closed.
// '\\\' -> shell-quote: \\ + \', still open. bash: \\\, closed.
//
// Even trailing \'s = bug ONLY when a later ' exists in the command:
// '\\' alone -> shell-quote backtracks, both parsers agree string closes. OK.
// '\\' 'next' -> shell-quote: \' consumes the closing ', finds next ' as
// false close, merges tokens. bash: two separate tokens.
//
// Detail: the regex alternation tries \' before [^']. For '\\', it matches
// the first \ via [^'] (next char is \, not '), then the second \ via \'
// (next char IS '). This consumes the closing '. The regex continues reading
// until it finds another ' to close the match. If none exists, it backtracks
// to [^'] for the second \ and closes correctly. If a later ' exists (e.g.,
// the opener of the next single-quoted arg), no backtracking occurs and
// tokens merge. See H1 report: git ls-remote 'safe\\' '--upload-pack=evil' 'repo'
// shell-quote: ["git","ls-remote","safe\\\\ --upload-pack=evil repo"]
// bash: ["git","ls-remote","safe\\\\","--upload-pack=evil","repo"]
if (!inSingleQuote) {
let backslashCount = 0
let j = i - 1
while (j >= 0 && command[j] === '\\') {
backslashCount++
j--
}
if (backslashCount > 0 && backslashCount % 2 === 1) {
return true
}
// Even trailing backslashes: only a bug when a later ' exists that
// the chunker regex can use as a false closing quote. We check for
// ANY later ' because the regex doesn't respect bash quote state
// (e.g., a ' inside double quotes is also consumable).
if (
backslashCount > 0 &&
backslashCount % 2 === 0 &&
command.indexOf("'", i + 1) !== -1
) {
return true
}
}
continue
}
}
return false
}
export function quote(args: ReadonlyArray<unknown>): string {
// First try the strict validation
const result = tryQuoteShellArgs([...args])
if (result.success) {
return result.quoted
}
// If strict validation failed, use lenient fallback
// This handles objects, symbols, functions, etc. by converting them to strings
try {
const stringArgs = args.map(arg => {
if (arg === null || arg === undefined) {
return String(arg)
}
const type = typeof arg
if (type === 'string' || type === 'number' || type === 'boolean') {
return String(arg)
}
// For unsupported types, use JSON.stringify as a safe fallback
// This ensures we don't crash but still get a meaningful representation
return jsonStringify(arg)
})
return shellQuoteQuote(stringArgs)
} catch (error) {
// SECURITY: Never use JSON.stringify as a fallback for shell quoting.
// JSON.stringify uses double quotes which don't prevent shell command execution.
// For example, jsonStringify(['echo', '$(whoami)']) produces "echo" "$(whoami)"
if (error instanceof Error) {
logError(error)
}
throw new Error('Failed to quote shell arguments safely')
}
}